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of the law"5 and carries to a logical conclusion the principle of
liability for an officer's mistake in identity in making an arrest.

W. E. N.
INSURANC]--AcCIDENT POLICY - TOTAL DisAwBITY AS ExCUSE FOR

FAILURE TO FmE NOTICE AND PROOFS

OF Loss.'

-

D is-

sued a life insurance policy to P which included a clause for indemnity for disability, and also a rider providing for double indemnity. P was injured in an automobile accident and rendered
physically and mentally disabled for about ninety-seven days thereafter. The indemnity provisions were to the effect that notice of
disability and proofs of loss should be filed within sixty days after
disability. Because of his condition, P did not file notices and
proofs within the time stipulated and D set this up as a defense to
P's action on the policy. After judgment on the verdict for P, D
obtained a writ of error. Held, that such disability of the insured
was an excuse for the failure to fie the notice and proofs of loss
within the time provided in the accident and disability clause of
the policy, and that the insurer was liable since notice and proofs
were filed within a reasonable time after recovery. Neill v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Insurance Company.Though there is respectable authority the other way,' this rule
of law has been generally accepted as the better doctrine in such
cases.4 The rule is based on a variety of grounds, among others,
that the insurance contract is one of adhesion and calls for a liberal

'15Vice v. Holly, 88 Miss. 572, 41 So. 7 (1906) ; Formwalt v. Hylton, 66 Tex.
288, 1 S. W. 376 (1886); POLLOCK, LAv Or TORTs 121-122; COOLEY, ToRTs
(3d ed. 1906) 316; but see Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N. W. 999 (1893).
1 For a more complete discussion of the principles involved in this subject,
see Raymond, Physical or Mental Incapacity as an Excuse for Failure to Give
Notice of Accident or Mak~e Proof of Disability Required by Provisions of Accident and Life Insurance Policies (1938) 5 INSURANCE CoUNsEL JOURNAL,
number 2, p. 15.
2 195 S. E. 860 (W. Va. 1938), Hatcher, J., dissenting.
3 Egan v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 60 F. (2d) 268 (N. D. Ga. 1932) ; Whiteside v.
North American Accident Ins. Co., 200 N. Y. 320, 93 N. E. 498, 35 L. R. A,
(. S.) 696 (1911).
Haymond, supran. 1; 33 C. J. 15; Note (1916) 14 R. C. L. 1333: 'Failure
to give notice is excused where the insured was disabled by an accident insured
against to give the required notice, according to some courts, though good
authority eists for the proposition that an insured is not relieved from the
obligation imposed upon him by the terms of his policy to give notice, by himself or his representative, within a certain time of the commencement of his
illness, by the fact that his illness is such as to render him delirious and unable
to remember that he has the policy.")
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construction in favor of the insured, and that courts abhor forfeitures.' Those courts denying recovery base their action on the
sacrednessr of contracts and that the parties intended the words
to have that meaning requiring strict compliance.8 It is probable
that the Neill case lays down, for the first time in West Virginia,
what is the majority rule with respect to disability as excusing
notice and filing of proofs within the time specified in accident
policies.
Counsel for D argued that the rule applicable to the Neill case
was laid down in lannarelli v. Kansas City Life Insurance Company.' In that case, the insured made default in the payment of
an insurance premium which was essential to keep the policy in
force. The policy provided for a waiver of payment of premiums
in the event of disability upon due proof thereof. No proof as required by the terms of the policy was made, occasioned by the insanity of the insured, and upon suit by his committee for reinstate.
ment of the policy, it was held that such disability was no excuse
for failure to file proof. It was sought to distinguish this from the
Neill case on the ground that the condition of the lannarelli case
was precedent and that of the Neill case was subsequent. The
dissent argued that the words of the conditions in both cases were
substantially similar, and regardless of whether subsequent or precedent, the conditions required the same treatment and if strict
compliance was necessary in one it was likewise necessary in the
other. However, it is suggested that the majority meant to do
more than merely to label the two conditions subsequent and precedent, but further intended to adopt the theory of New England
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Reynolds,10 that in accident
cases the clause in question is-in the nature of a condition subsequent wherein the insurer defends against a liability already
accrued and collection by the insured on the policy is purely a matter of mechanics, whereas in cases involving a waiver clause, no
liability on the policy has accured. In the latter case, the condition
5VANcE, Ixsu.xcE (2d ed. 1930) 215: "To hold the insured strictly to
terms in the choosing of which he had no part, and the meaning of which he
often cannot understand, would often work gross injustice which the courts are
loth to inflict."
6 Comstock v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n, 116 Wis. 382, 93 N. W. 22 (1903).
7 Egan v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Whiteside v. North American Accident Ins.
Co., both supra n. 3; Wheeler v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 82 NT.Y.
543, 550-552, 37 Am. Rep. 594 (1880).
s Haymond, supra n. 1.
9 114 W. Va. 88, 171 S. E. 748 (1933).
19217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151 (1928).
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on which the forfeiture may be based is not given as liberal a construction in favor of the insured as it would where the liability has
already accrued, either in whole or in part."
It is further suggested that there is another distinction for
the purpose of justifying the Neill case, as the Iannarelli case is
still law. In the former, it is the disability insured against that
may defeat recovery by the insured, while in the waiver of premium
cases, the disability involved is not insured against but may be
taken advantage of by the insured as an excuse for nonpayment of
premiums. In the former it would be manifestly unjust to say
that the happening of the event insured against would defeat recovery, 12 and insurers would be unable to sell such policies." Although the two rules are now well established in West Virginia, it
is arguable that as the courts abhor forfeitures and construe liberally in favor of the insured, the impossibility should be an exeus6 in
both cases, thereby permitting a similar recovery in the lannarelli
case.' 4
W. G. W.
PLEADING

-

PLEA IN ABATEMENT -

-ENERAL APPEARANCE. -

Service of process on petitioner, defendant in a damage action, was
voidable. Petitioner at rules filed his two pleas in abatement, one
averring lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, the other setting
up the defect in service of process. A demurrer to the first plea
was sustained, and the second plea was overruled on motion. This
is an original proceeding in prohibition by petitioner against the
circuit judge to prohibit further prosecution of the action because
of lack of jurisdiction. Writ of prohibition awarded. Held, that
the filing of the pleas in abatement did not waive the defective
service of process. Morris v. Calhoun, Judge.'
This case raises the question of when a plea in abatement will
constitute a general appearance so as to waive defects in process.
Consider first what is comprehended by the term "plea in abate" Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S. W. 847, 54 A.

L. R. 600 (1927).

12 Hayes v. Continental Casualty Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S.W. 135 (1903);

7 COOLLY, BaRiFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5918.

13 Haymond, supra n. 1.

'14Swann v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852, 159 S. E. 192 (1931) ; Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), per Soper,
Circ. J., wherein recovery was allowed.

' 195 S.E. 341 (W. Va. 1938).
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